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Abstract: We examine cost-reducing investment in vertically-related
oligopolies, where firms may be vertically integrated or separated.
Analyzing a standard linear Cournot model, we show that: (i) In-
tegrated firms invest more than separated competitors. (ii) Vertical
integration increases own investment and decreases competitor invest-
ment. (iii) Firms may integrate strategically so as to preempt in-
vestments by competitors. Adopting a reduced-form approach, we
identify demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market
as the driving force for these results. We show that our results gen-
eralize naturally beyond the Cournot example, and we discuss policy
implications.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, vertically integrated firms compete with separated firms.
Well-documented examples include the oil industry (Bindemann 1999), the
beer industry in the UK (Slade 1998a), and the gasoline retail market in
Vancouver (1998b). These examples suggest that the coexistence of vertical
integration and separation is an important aspect of product market com-
petition in vertically related industries. Moreover, it is sometimes claimed
that vertical integration and market share are closely related. For instance,
the European Commission (1999) argued in the highly controversial Air-
tours/First Choice case that vertical integration was a prerequisite for sig-
nificant increases of market shares and, conversely, that only firms of suffi-
cient size were able to integrate vertically. While the theoretical basis of the
argument was not entirely clear, the UK market for foreign package holidays
under consideration appeared to match the Commission’s description.1
Our main concern in this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation of
such patterns. We start with a linear Cournot model adapted from Salinger
(1988) to motivate our more general reduced-form analysis.2 In this Cournot
model, two upstream suppliers face two downstream firms. Downstream firms
require an intermediate good produced by upstream firms. Downstreammar-
ginal costs consist of the costs of obtaining the intermediate good plus the
costs of transforming the intermediate good into the final product. If a down-
stream firm integrates with one of the suppliers, its downstream marginal
costs fall; this is the familiar efficiency effect of integration. However, inte-
gration also influences the marginal costs of the downstream competitor: As
the integrated firm is no longer active in the wholesale market, both supply
and demand on this market are affected, resulting in an ambiguous wholesale
price effect of integration. In our example, the effect of decreasing demand
dominates, and the wholesale price falls. Thus, from the integrating firm’s
point of view, vertical integration has an undesired side effect: the competi-
1We shall discuss this market in more detail in section 2.
2Our reduced-form approach is also consistent with other models of vertically-related in-
dustries that consider product market decisions explicitly. See, e.g., Ordover et al. (1990),
Riordan (1998), and Linnemer (2003).
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tor’s marginal costs fall as well. Even so, the efficiency effect dominates in the
sense that integration increases both the output and the mark-up of the in-
tegrating firm, and reduces the corresponding quantities for the competitor.3
We further suppose that downstream competitors can invest into reducing
their costs of transforming the intermediate good into the final product. Like
vertical integration, higher downstream efficiency increases own equilibrium
demand and mark-up and decreases the competitor’s demand and mark-up.
For this setting, we provide an explanation of the coincidence of vertical
integration and high market share: We show that, if competitors in the same
market decide simultaneously about cost-reducing investments, integrated
firms will invest more than separated firms. Thus efficiency and integration
tend to go hand in hand, explaining why efficient firms have high market
shares.
We then turn to a closely related set of issues. To analyze the impact
of vertical integration on investment decisions, we compare the firms’ cost-
reducing investments in different vertical structures. First, we show that
firm 1’s vertical integration increases its own investment and decreases the
investment of firm 2. Second, we consider the case where firms decide about
vertical integration before carrying out cost-reducing investments. As an
immediate consequence of the last result, firms may integrate strategically so
as to avoid cost-reducing investments by competitors, i.e. vertical integration
may serve as an instrument of preemption.4
To explore to what extent our results generalize beyond the linear Cournot
model, we adopt a reduced-form analysis. This approach also allows us to
understand the common intuition behind our results. We find that, for the
above results to hold, it is crucial that the profit increase associated with
cost-reducing investment is higher for integrated firms than for separated
firms. Such a relation is a plausible consequence of demand/mark-up com-
plementarities: Intuitively, any activity that increases equilibrium demand is
3A fortiori, integration must have a positive effect on equilibrium outputs and mark-ups
in examples where integration increases the wholesale price and thus competitor marginal
costs, i.e., if a foreclosure effect is present. See Rey and Tirole (forthcoming) for a survey
of the foreclosure literature.
4This result is related to Colangelo (1995), who finds that vertical integration may
pre-empt horizontal mergers.
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more valuable the higher the equilibrium mark-up (price minus unit-costs),
and any activity that increases the equilibrium mark-up is more valuable
the higher equilibrium demand. As both integration and cost-reducing in-
vestment increase mark-up and demand, they are mutually complementary.
Similar arguments show that cost-reducing investment is less valuable when
the competitor is not integrated. Based on this notion of complementarity,
we show that our above results generalize quite naturally beyond the linear
Cournot model.
Our analysis suggests that evaluating vertical mergers may be even more
subtle than was previously thought: Prohibiting vertical integration not only
affects markets directly via the familiar efficiency and foreclosure effects. In
addition, it has potential effects on investments. In the simple Cournot
example, these effects of prohibiting investment are unambiguously negative,
but this result is not necessarily very general.
This paper adds to the literature on the relation between vertical inte-
gration and investment incentives. A key results of this literature, which has
typically adopted the incomplete contracts approach, is that underinvestment
is likely to occur in bilateral monopoly.5 That is, in the absence of suitable
contractual arrangements, both upstream and downstream investments are
usually too low for separated firms relative to the vertical integration case.
The driving force of this finding is the hold-up problem: When contracts are
incomplete, both firms face the risk of expropriation from the returns of their
relation-specific investments. Anticipating the hold-up problem, both firms
underinvest. Unlike this literature, we compare the investment incentives
of integrated and separated competitors in any given industry. Accounting
for the strategic interactions between them, we find that it is still true that
integrated firms invest more than separated ones.6 The driving force of our
result is a double mark-up rather than a hold-up problem. In both cases,
however, the presence of a vertical externality is crucial for the result.7
5The standard reference is Hart and Moore (1990). See Hart (1995) and Holmström
and Roberts (1998) for surveys and further references.
6In a related paper (Buehler and Schmutzler 2003), we examine the endogenous vertical
integration decisions of potentially asymmetric firms in more detail.
7Our analysis also differs from Banerjee and Lin (2003), who consider the investment
incentives of downstream competitors facing a monopolistic upstream supplier. As all
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we con-
sider the UK tour operating business as a case study. Section 3 introduces our
Cournot example. Section 4 presents our more general reduced form duopoly
model. Section 5 discusses policy implications, and section 6 concludes.
2 A Case Study: The Market for Foreign
Package Holidays in the UK
We consider the market for foreign package holidays in the UK to illustrate
how asymmetric vertical market structures affect product market competi-
tion in vertically-related industries. The recent developments in this market
are well documented, since it has twice been subject to antitrust proceedings
during the 1990s.8 The supply side of this industry consists of three vertical
layers (Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1997):
(i) Tour Operation: Foreign holidays packages are assembled by tour op-
erators contracting with the suppliers of transport services and accom-
modation. Tour operators sell their packages directly to the public
or–more commonly–through travel agencies.
(ii) Travel Agencies: Travel agents act on behalf of tour operators to sell
holidays packages to consumers; they are typically rewarded by a com-
mission on the package price.
(iii) Airlines: Many foreign holiday packages require air transportation ser-
vices. Airlines often provide seat capacities to more than one tour
operator.9
downstream firms are assumed to be separated, these authors cannot compare the behavior
of separated and integrated firms in the same industry. Instead, they are concerned with
the effect of the number of downstream firms on investment.
8The first analysis was undertaken by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1997)
in the light of increasing concentration and widespread vertical integration. The second
investigation was carried out by the European Commission (1999) when Airtours, one of
the most important players in the industry, was attempting to take over First Choice,
another major player.
9We shall ignore a fourth layer, accomodation, because vertical integration of tour
operators into accomodation plays a limited role.
5
Figure 1 reproduces the market shares of the largest tour operators as of
1998. Importantly, all of the four largest firms with market shares of 15%
or higher are fully integrated, i.e. the dominant firms are both integrated
backwards into the provision of air transportation and forward into the travel
agency business. Most of the remaining firms are separated, the largest with
a market share below 3%. The aggregate market share of all other firms
with individual market shares below 1% is around 8%. That is, the industry
consists of a small group of vertically integrated tour operators with high
market shares, and a fringe, containing numerous firms with small market
shares, most of which are vertically separated. The European Commission
(1999, no. 73) was clearly aware of this asymmetric market structure when
it pointed out that the
“polarization of the market into large integrated companies
and smaller non-integrated companies is a widely recognized trend
in the industry.”
Similarly, Damien Neven noted that there are essentially two ways of
doing business in this industry: Either
“stay small and buy inputs or produce large volumes and in-
tegrate vertically.”10
<Figure 1 around here>
The market for foreign package holidays in the UK suggests that there are
important differences in the conduct of vertically integrated and separated
firms in a given industry. In particular, vertically integrated firms appear
to be larger than separated firms. In the following, we shall investigate to
what extent these differences can be attributed to general forces associated
with product market competition. In doing so, it will be crucial to analyze
the incentives of vertically integrated and separated firms to invest into cost
reduction at the downstream level.
10Cited after the European Commission (1999, no. 73)
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3 A Linear Cournot Example
To motivate our reduced-form analysis below, we consider a linear Cournot
model adapted from Salinger (1988), where downstream firms can invest into
reducing processing costs.
3.1 Assumptions
There are two upstream and two downstream firms. Each downstream firm
i = 1, 2 may be integrated backwards with one of the upstream suppliers.
We use Vi to denote firm i’s state of vertical integration, i.e.
Vi =
(
0, if i is vertically separated,
1, if i is vertically integrated,
i = 1, 2.
Further, let V = (V1, V2) denote the vertical structure of the industry. The
inverse demand function for the final product is given by P (Q) = a−Q, with
qi denoting the quantity of firm i, Q = q1 + q2 and a > 0.
To produce one unit of the final product (the downstream good), firms
require one unit of an intermediate product (the upstream good). Suppose
that, for simplicity, the marginal cost of producing the intermediate product
is constant and normalized to zero. The marginal cost of obtaining the
intermediate product is given by wi, which is the wholesale price faced by a
separated firm i and the marginal cost of producing the intermediate product
for an integrated firm i. Thus, we have wi = 0 for an integrated firm. Further,
we assume that transforming the intermediate product adds ti to marginal
costs, so that the marginal costs of downstream firm i are given by
ci = wi + ti.
Firms may differ with respect to their initial transformation costs t0i . Define
t ≡ max (t01, t02) and let Y 0i = t− t0i denote the initial efficiency of firm i.
The sequence of events is as follows. In the first stage of the game, firms
can invest into cost reduction. To reduce transformation costs by yi, they
have to invest K(yi) = ky2i . After investment, the efficiency of firm i is
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Yi = Y 0i + yi and marginal costs are given by
ci = wi + t− Y 0i − yi. (1)
In the second stage of the game, upstream firms determine the wholesale
price. In the third stage, Cournot competition takes place downstream, with
cost structures determined in period 1 and 2 according to (1). Obviously,
stage 2 is irrelevant if both firms are vertically integrated: If V = (1, 1), the
costs of obtaining the input are given exogenously as wi = 0 by assumption.
However, if V = (1, 0) or V = (0, 1), the upstream firm sets the monopoly
price for the separated downstream firm. If V = (0, 0), separated upstream
firms compete à la Cournot.
3.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the investment levels are given as yi (V),
and the resulting efficiency levels of downstream firms as Yi (V). Input costs
are wi (V,Y). Furthermore, we use the notation Qi (V,Y) to denote down-
stream outputs for arbitrary integration vectors V and efficiency levels Y,
assuming that the input price is wi (V,Y). Similarly, we write the equilib-
rium mark-ups and profits of downstream firms as Mi(V,Y) and Πi(V,Y),
respectively.
Table 1 summarizes the results for the Cournot example, assuming that
firms are equally efficient initially (Y 01 = Y 02 = 0), which immediately implies
Yi = yi, i = 1, 2. It describes the SPE for the three market configurations
V = (0, 0), V = (1, 0) and V = (1, 1) and the associated reference configu-
rations where firms are not allowed to invest (i.e. y = (y1, y2) = (0, 0) by
assumption). Equilibrium wholesale prices, quantities, mark-ups and profits
for each configuration are given as functions of the efficiency levels y, and
the efficiency levels y as functions of k. Throughout, α ≡ a− t is a measure
of market size. Table 2 summarizes the results for the special case k = 1.
<Tables 1 and 2 around here>
We now highlight the observations that are particularly important for our
more general analysis below.
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3.3 Comparing Investments of Competitors
First, we compare the investments of integrated and separated firms in the
same market. Thus, we consider the asymmetric market structureV = (1, 0).
Figure 2a) depicts the optimal investment levels y1 and y2 as functions of the
cost parameter k, fixing α = 1. Figure 2b) shows the resulting market shares
s1 and s2 = 1− s1, respectively. Clearly, the integrated firm 1 invests more
and has a higher market share than the separated firm 2.
<Figure 2 around here>
To put the result into perspective, consider output decisions when firms
are unable to invest into cost reduction (or equivalently, k → ∞). Figure
2b) indicates that even when firms cannot invest into cost reduction, the
market share of the integrated firm is higher than that of the separated firm,
i.e. s1(y1 = 0, y2 = 0) > 0.5. This reflects the simple fact that the integrated
firm has lower marginal costs than the separated firm.
However, this is not the end of the story: If firms can invest into cost
reduction, the gap between the two firms widens, since the integrated firm
invests more than the separated firm (see Figure 2b)). However, it is not
quite as obvious why the integrated firm invests more than the separated
firm. In section 4, we will show that the intuition for this result becomes
clearer in a more general model. We summarize our results for V = (1, 0) as
follows:
Observation 1 In the linear Cournot example, the integrated firm has higher
market share, output and mark-up than the separated firm, even if y1 = y2 =
0. If investment levels are endogenous, the integrated firm invests more and
the differences in outputs and mark-ups increase.
3.4 Comparing Investments for Different Vertical Struc-
tures
Observation 1 compared the investment behavior of integrated and sepa-
rated firms in a given vertical structure. This comparison was natural to
understand the relation between integration and market share. For policy
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discussions, it is also important to understand how changes in vertical struc-
ture affect the investment behavior of firms in the market. For instance, if, in
a setting with two initially separated firms, a vertical merger is prohibited,
does the prohibition affect the investment decisions of the firms, and ulti-
mately social welfare? Table 2 indicates that starting from V = (0, 0), firm
1’s vertical integration (i) increases own investment, (ii) decreases competitor
investment, and (iii) increases welfare W .11 Starting from V0 = (1, 0), firm
2’s integration has similar effects on investments and welfare. We summarize
these results as follows:
Observation 2 In the linear Cournot example, integration of one firm in-
creases this firm’s investments and decreases the competitor’s investments.
In addition, it increases welfare.
In section 4.2, we argue that the effects of integration on investment are
likely to be very general, whereas the impact on welfare will be ambiguous.
3.5 Strategic Integration Incentives
Next, we show that there are strategic incentives to integrate. To this end,
reconsider Table 2. For k = 1, this table lists the equilibrium profits, net of
investment costs, Π∗i (V) = Πi (V,y(V)). It is straightforward to calculate
firm i’s integration incentive∆∗i (Vj), which is defined as the profit differential
resulting from integration if the competitor’s integration status is Vj. The
table shows that
∆∗1 (0) ≡ Π∗1 (1, 0)−Π∗1 (0, 0) ≈ 0.233α2;
∆∗1 (1) ≡ Π∗1 (1, 1)−Π∗1 (0, 1) ≈ 0.089α2.
We now compare the profit differentials ∆∗i (Vj) with the corresponding
expressions when firms are not allowed to invest. Thus, define
∆NI1 (V2) ≡ Π1 (1, V2;0)−Π1 (0, V2;0) ,
11More specifically, y1(1, 0) = 0.363α > y1(0, 0) = 0.108α, y2(1, 0) = 0.040α <
y2(0, 0) = 0.108α, and W (1, 0) = 0.564α2 > W (0, 0) = 0.318α2.
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and similarly for ∆NI2 (V1), where the superscript indicates “No Investment”.
Straightforward calculations show that
∆NIi (0) ≈ 0.146α2 < ∆∗1 (0) ; ∆NIi (1) ≈ 0.083α2 < ∆∗1 (1) .
Thus, compared with a game without investments, integration incentives are
higher if integration is followed by investment. More in line with the strategic
investment literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1984), consider the game
with investments, but suppose investments are fixed at pre-integration levels
y (0, V2). Define
e∆1 (V2,y (0, V2)) ≡ Π1 (1, V2;y (0, V2))−Π∗1 (0, V2;y (0, V2)) .
Thus, e∆1 gives direct integration incentives, assuming that efficiency levels
are fixed at pre-integration levels. We have
e∆1 (0,y (0, V2)) ≈ 0.179α2 < ∆∗1 (0) ; e∆1 (1,y (0, V2)) ≈ 0.042α2 < ∆∗1 (1) .
Referring back to Observation 2, the intuition is simple: The strategic inte-
gration incentive comes from the negative effect of integration on the competi-
tor’s investment decision, which is desirable for the integrating firm. Thus,
we obtain the following conclusion:
Observation 3 In the linear Cournot example, there is a strategic incentive
to invest into cost reduction.
We now turn to our reduced-form analysis.
4 A More General Model
We now show how Observations 1-3 generalize beyond the linear Cournot
model. This will also clarify the intuition behind these observations.
4.1 Assumptions and Preliminary Results
As in the Cournot example, we suppose that there are two downstream firms
that may or may not be integrated backwards. There are three conceivable
11
vertical industry structures:
(i) Full separation (V = (0, 0)): Two vertically separated downstream
firms are supplied by upstream firms.
(ii) Asymmetric integration (V = (1, 0) or V = (0, 1)): One of the down-
stream firms is integrated, facing a separated competitor. This com-
petitor is supplied by at least one upstream firm.
(iii) Full integration (V = (1, 1)): Two vertically integrated firms compete
in the downstream market.
We continue to assume that downstream marginal costs ci consist of the
costs of obtaining the input wi and the transformation costs ti that depend
on the firms’ efficiency levels Yi = Y 0i + yi, such that ti = t− Yi and
ci (V,Y) = wi (V,Y) + t− Yi.
However, rather than explicitly calculating wi, we shall make the following
assumption on the firms’ cost functions, which is consistent with the linear
Cournot example in section 3 (see Table 1):
Assumption 1 For i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, downstream costs satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) wi = 0 if Vi = 1; wi > 0 for Vi = 0;
(ii) ∂ci/∂Yi < 0;
(iii) ∂cj/∂Yi > 0, or, if ∂cj/∂Yi < 0, then |∂ci/∂Yi| is sufficiently large
relative to |∂cj/∂Yi| .
Intuitively, (i) states that if a firm is integrated, it obtains the inter-
mediate good at marginal production costs, which are zero by assumption.
Otherwise, it must buy the intermediate good from the wholesale market at
a strictly positive price. (ii) follows directly from (i) for integrated firms. For
separated firms, (ii) requires that the direct cost reduction effect of higher
efficiency is not outweighed by a possible increase in wholesale prices. (iii)
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states that, as a result of an increase in transformation efficiency, the whole-
sale price must either increase or, as in the Cournot example, decrease not
too strongly such that the cost reduction for the competitor is smaller than
for the investing firm.12
For given marginal costs ci, i = 1, 2, we model downstream competition
in reduced form as follows:
Assumption 2 : For every cost vector c =(c1, c2), there exists a unique
product market equilibrium resulting in outputs qi (c), prices pi (c) , mark-
ups mi (c) = pi (c)− ci, and profits πi (c), respectively, such that
πi (c) = qi (c) ·mi (c) ,
where (i) qi and mi are decreasing in ci, and (ii) qi and mi are increasing in
cj, with |∂qi/∂ci| > ∂qi/∂cj.
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold in standard oligopoly models, including the
linear Cournot example discussed above.
As in section 3, we write profits, outputs and mark-ups directly as a
function Πi (V,Y) of the vertical structure and cost reducing investments,
i.e.
Πi (V,Y) = πi (c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)) , (2)
and similarly for Qi and Mi.
In addition, we require that profits satisfy the following symmetry condi-
tion, which obviously holds in the Cournot case.
Assumption 3 Product market profits are exchangeable, i.e. for all V 0, V 00 ∈
{0, 1} and Y 0, Y 00 ∈ [0,∞),
Π1 (V 0, V 00, Y 0, Y 00) = Π2 (V 00, V 0, Y 00, Y 0) .
In the next two lemmas, we show that our assumptions imply conditions
on product market profits that turn out to be essential for the investment
game.
12The precise meaning of “sufficiently large” in (iii) will become clear in the proof of
Lemma 1 below.
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Lemma 1 : Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then
(i) M1 (1, 0;Y) > M1 (0, 1;Y) ;Q1 (1, 0;Y) > Q1 (0, 1;Y) ;
(ii) Mi and Qi are both increasing in Yi and decreasing in Yj.
Proof. See appendix.
Result (i) compares mark-up and demand of an integrated firm facing
a separated competitor with those of a separated firm facing an integrated
competitor.13 Intuitively, result (i) follows in two steps: First, starting from
V = (0, 1), suppose firm 1 integrates, resulting in V = (1, 1). This reduces
own costs and leaves competitor costs unaffected; thus own mark-up and
demand increase. Next, compare V = (1, 1) and V = (1, 0): own costs are
unaffected and the competitor’s costs increase. Again, own mark-up and
demand increase. Thus, combining the two steps, the result follows.
Result (ii) states that an increase in own efficiency increases own demand
and mark-up, and conversely for an increase in competitor efficiency. The
first part of the statement is obvious if efficiency increases not only decrease
own costs, but also increase the wholesale price, so that competitor costs
increase. If higher own efficiency decreases the wholesale price, competitor
cost reductions could, in principle, outweigh the positive effect of lower own
costs. Assumptions 1 (iii) and 2 (ii) guarantee that own effects dominate
over cross effects. The second part of the statement uses similar arguments.
We now obtain our central lemma.
Lemma 2 : Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) Suppose that
∂Q1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) ≥ ∂Q1∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) ; ∂M1∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) ≥ ∂M1∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) . (3)
Then
∂Π1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) > ∂Π1∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) . (4)
13Obviously, an analogous statement holds for M2 and Q2.
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(ii) Suppose that
∂2Q1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0; ∂
2M1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0. (5)
Then
∂Πi/∂Yi is decreasing in Yj for j 6= i, i = 1, 2 (6)
(iii) Suppose that
∂2Q1
∂Y 21
≥ 0, ∂
2M1
∂Y 21
≥ 0. (7)
Then
∂Πi/∂Yi is increasing in Yi for i = 1, 2. (8)
Proof. See appendix.
Statement (i) gives conditions for investment incentives to be higher for an
integrated firm facing a separated competitor than for a separated firm facing
an integrated competitor. (ii) gives conditions for investment incentives to
decrease when a competitor becomes more efficient. (iii) gives conditions for
more efficient firms to have higher investment incentives than less efficient
firms.
The intuition for statement (i) relies on Lemma 1. This result says that
mark-up and demand are higher for an integrated firm facing a separated
competitor than for a separated firm facing an integrated competitor. Since
higher mark-up means that demand increases resulting from greater effi-
ciency are more valuable, and higher demand means that mark-up increases
are more valuable, the benefits from integration and cost reduction tend to
reinforce each other. Put differently, there are demand/mark-up complemen-
tarities. As a result, an integrated firm with high mark-up typically finds
it more beneficial to invest into cost reduction than a separated competi-
tor. There is, however, a potential countervailing effect: The size of the
demand and mark-up increases associated with higher efficiency could, in
principle, decrease with vertical integration. The additional condition on
∂Qi/∂Yi and ∂Mi/∂Yi excludes this possibility. This condition is fairly nat-
ural: higher efficiency increases the wholesale price. This tends to reduce
the output and mark-up increases resulting from higher transformation ef-
ficiency for a separated firm–an effect that is absent for integrated firms.
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In addition, this condition is stronger than necessary. All we require is that
the demand/mark-up complementarities dominate over any negative effect
of integration on ∂Qi/∂Yi and ∂Mi/∂Yi.
The arguments for statements (ii) and (iii) are analogous. In each case,
the changes of variables under consideration (increasing in Yi and decreasing
in Yj, respectively) lead to increases in demand and mark-up which are mutu-
ally reinforcing. Again, there might be countereffects of Yi and Yj on ∂Qi/∂Yi
and ∂Mi/∂Yj that could upset the results. The additional conditions on the
second partial derivatives of Qi and Mi exclude this possibility.14
4.2 The Cost Reduction Game
We now analyze how the cost reduction decisions of integrated firms differ
from those of separated competitors. Consider a cost-reduction game such
that, for given vectors V and Y0, firms simultaneously choose the extent to
which they want to reduce their transformation costs. Reducing costs by
yi involves investment costs of Ki (yi, Y 0i ), with Ki increasing in yi.15 With
y = (y1, y2), the firms’ objective functions are given by
Πi
¡
V,Y0 + y
¢
−Ki
¡
yi, Y 0i
¢
.
The next result generalizes Observation 1. As a preliminary remark, recall
what our analysis has achieved so far: In particular, we have shown that
the primitive assumptions of our model on outputs, mark-ups and wholesale
prices imply (4) if supplemented by (3), and (8) if supplemented by (5).
We can thus formulate our next results either in terms of the more general
conditions (4) and (8), or in terms of the more primitive conditions (3) and
(5).
Proposition 1 Consider the cost reduction game and assume it has a
unique equilibrium. Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 and (3) and (5), or,
more generally, conditions (4) and (6) are satisfied. Then
14In the linear Cournot example, these additional conditions are satisfied (see table 1).
15Though we make no additional assumptions on Ki, it is useful to think of ∂Ki/∂yi as
being increasing in Y 0i and yi to capture decreasing returns to investment.
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(i) If Vk = 1, Vc = 0 and Y 0k = Y 0c = 0, then yk > yc.
(ii) Suppose ∂2Πi/∂Yi∂yi ≥ ∂2Ki/∂Yi∂yi. If Vk = 1, Vc = 0 and Y 0k ≥ Y 0c ,
then yk > yc.
Proof. See Appendix.
Result (i) states that, if the firms differ only with respect to their ver-
tical integration status, the integrated firm will invest more into cost re-
duction than the separated firm. Intuitively, by Lemma 1, the integrated
firm has higher equilibrium demand and mark-up than its competitor. The
demand/mark-up complementarity therefore implies that the integrated firm
has higher incentives to invest than the competitor, as reflected in (4). In
addition, (6) implies that the higher investment of the integrated firm and
the lower investment of the competitor are mutually reinforcing. Thus, inte-
grated firms should invest more than separated firms.
Result (ii) generalizes (i) to the case where integrated firms have higher
initial efficiency levels. The generalization comes at the cost of the additional
condition ∂2Πi/∂Yi∂yi ≥ ∂2Ki/∂Yi∂yi, which ensures that the greater initial
efficiency of integrated firms reinforces the higher cost-reduction incentive
coming from integration itself. This condition is more restrictive than (8),
which merely guarantees that the product market profit effects of further
investment (gross of investment costs) are greater for firms that are already
more efficient. The more restrictive condition in (ii) makes sure that the
same is true for net product market profits.16
To sum up, at least in a set-up where integrated downstream firms are not
active as suppliers on the upstream market, the observation that integrated
firms tend to invest more into cost reduction than separated firms should be
expected to hold quite generally, as it only requires fairly natural assumptions
on product market competition. A countervailing force might arise if there
are strongly decreasing returns to investments, and integrated firms have
greater initial efficiency. Proposition 1 is consistent with the observation that
16Proposition 1 says nothing about why one firm is integrated and the other one is not,
as assumed in part (i) of Proposition 1. However, in Buehler and Schmutzler (2003), we
show that such asymmetries are likely to arise even when otherwise identical firms decide
whether to integrate.
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integrated firms tend to have high market shares: Not only does integration
have a direct efficiency effect which works towards higher market shares, but
integrated firms also tend to invest more into cost reduction.17
We now move towards issues that are potentially relevant for policy con-
siderations. When examining a vertical merger, antitrust authorities should
evaluate the effect of a firm’s vertical integration on both firms’ investments
and, ultimately, on welfare. This evaluation involves a comparison of the
firms’ investments under different market structures, whereas Proposition 1
was based on a comparison of investments within a given asymmetric ver-
tical market structure. For example, antitrust authorities will be interested
in the effect on the firms’ investments when vertical structure changes from
V = (0, 0) to V0 = (1, 0), whereas our above comparison involved the invest-
ments of firm 1 and 2 for V0 = (1, 0). We now discuss the effect of vertical
integration on the firms’ investment in some more detail.
The next result, which is in the spirit of Observation 2, gives the condi-
tions under which a firm’s vertical integration increases own investment and
decreases competitor investment.
Proposition 2 Suppose that condition (6) holds. In addition, suppose
∂Πi
∂Yi
is non-decreasing in Vi and non-increasing in Vj. (9)
Then the equilibrium level of Yi is non-decreasing in Vi and non-increasing
in Vj.
The proof is a simple application of Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Th. 5).
Intuitively, by (9), if one firm integrates, this increases its incentive to invest,
and it decreases the competitor’s investment incentive. By (6), these effects
are mutually reinforcing.
Proposition 2 is useful, because the underlying condition (9) can be seen
to be very plausible, using a similar intuition as in the justification of (4): In
most conceivable examples, own integration increases equilibrium output and
17It should be noted that Proposition 1 can be generalized to more than two firms. The
proof uses similar techniques as the special case of two firms.
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mark-up, which, in turn, increases the benefits of the mark-up and output
increases resulting from higher efficiency. Similarly, integration of the com-
petitor tends to reduce own output and mark-up which tends to decrease the
benefits of higher efficiency. As argued in the justification of (4), there may
be countereffects arising because the size of the output and mark-up increases
from integration may depend on the efficiency levels as well. Also, clearly,
the required condition (9) is less general than the corresponding condition (4)
for Proposition 1: (9) implies (4), but the reverse implication is not true.18
Nevertheless, Proposition 2 indicates that under fairly natural assumptions
that are based on demand/mark-up complementarities, the finding that a
firm’s vertical integration increases own investment and reduces competitor
investment generalizes beyond the linear Cournot model.
Proposition 2 suggests that antitrust policy towards vertical mergers is
likely to be tricky even when foreclosure is not an issue, that is, when in-
tegration does not raise rivals’ costs: Prohibiting vertical mergers may help
avoiding polarized market structures and strategic vertical integration, but
the effects on investment are less obvious. Typically, prohibiting vertical
integration reduces investments of those firms that would have integrated,
whereas it increases the investments of those firms that would have not inte-
grated. In the simple Cournot example, the net welfare effect of a prohibition
was negative–but this is not necessarily true in general.
4.3 Strategic Vertical Integration
Generalizing Observation 3, we now analyze strategic incentives for vertical
integration in a setting where integration decisions precede cost-reducing
investments. We assume that initial states are given by V0 = Y0 = 0. In
stage 1, firms make integration decisions vi, leading to V1 = v. In stage 2,
they choose cost-reducing investments as in the cost reduction game analyzed
in section 4.2. For simplicity, we suppose that, for eachV1, the cost-reduction
game has a unique equilibrium y (V1) = y (v). Further, we generalize the
notation introduced in the example:
18Also, generalization of Proposition 2 to more than two firms requires additional
conditions.
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Notation 1 Firm i’s profit as a function of integration decisions, evaluated
at the equilibrium choices of cost reduction, is given by
Π∗i (v) ≡ Πi (v,y (v))−Ki (yi (v) , 0) , i = 1, 2.
The profit differentials associated with integration, accounting for the in-
duced changes in cost reduction, are denoted by
∆∗1 (v2) ≡ Π∗1 (1, v2)−Π∗1 (0, v2) ; ∆∗2 (v1) ≡ Π∗2 (v1, 1)−Π∗2 (v1, 0) .
In this setting, the following observations are straightforward.
Proposition 3 Consider the two-stage game where (4) and (6) are satis-
fied.
(i) If V 1k = 1, V 1c = 0, then yk (V) > yc (V).
(ii) ∆∗1 (v2) ≥ ∆1 (v2;y (0, v2)) ;∆∗2 (v1) ≥ ∆2 (v1;y (v1, 0)) .
Part (i) of Proposition 3 is a direct application of Proposition 1 (i) to the
second-period subgames of the two-stage game. Part (ii) states that there
is a strategic incentive to integrate vertically: The left-hand side of each
inequality in (ii) is the profit differential associated with integration, taking
into account the induced change of second-period investment behavior. The
right-hand side is the profit differential associated with integration, fixing the
second period equilibrium at the pre-integration level. The difference is the
strategic effect of vertical integration. Intuitively, because of demand/mark-
up complementarities, integration makes cost-reducing investments for the
competitor less attractive, which increases profits of the integrating firm.
Thus, a firm might integrate to reduce the incentives for a competitor to cut
costs.19
19In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), integration corresponds to a top
dog strategy.
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5 Conclusions
This paper considers investment incentives in vertically-related oligopolies,
where firms may be vertically integrated or separated. We show that in-
tegrated firms invest more into cost reduction than separated competitors,
which fits nicely with the observation that integrated firms have higher mar-
ket share. Further, we demonstrate that a firm’s vertical integration typically
increases its own investment and decreases competitor investment. Finally,
when firms decide sequentially about vertical integration and cost reduction,
they may use vertical integration so as to strategically reduce investments by
competitors.
Our analysis sheds new light on the competitive effects of vertical inte-
gration and possible antitrust policies towards them. For instance, we saw
that the complementarity of vertical integration and cost-reducing invest-
ment tends to give rise to polarized market structure with large integrated
and small separated firms. That is, dominance of a small number of firms is a
more serious concern than the purely horizontal setting or the standard ver-
tical setting without investment suggest. Furthermore, we found that firms
may use vertical integration strategically so as to preempt cost-reducing in-
vestment by competitors. Antitrust authorities may be tempted to deal with
these problems by prohibiting vertical mergers. However, doing so is likely
to prevent cost-reducing investment on the part of the integrating firm, and
may well reduce social welfare. That is, antitrust policy towards vertical
mergers may be even more subtle than was previously thought.
6 Appendix 1: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) By Assumption 1, we have c1 (1, 0;Y) = 0 = c1 (1, 1;Y) < c1 (0, 1;Y) and
c2 (0, 1;Y) = 0 = c2 (1, 1;Y) < c2 (1, 0;Y). The claim follows from Assump-
tion 2 (i) and (ii).
(ii) First consider
∂Qi
∂Yi
=
∂qi
∂ci
∂ci
∂Yi
+
∂qi
∂cj
∂cj
∂Yi
for j 6= i.
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By (ii) in Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, ∂Qi/∂Yi > 0 if ∂cj/∂Yi > 0.
If ∂cj/∂Yi < 0, part (ii) of Assumption 2 guarantees the result provided
that |∂ci/∂Yi| > |∂cj/∂Yi| . This is implied by (iii) of Assumption 1. Now,
consider
∂Qi
∂Yj
=
∂qi
∂ci
∂ci
∂Yj
+
∂qi
∂cj
∂cj
∂Yj
for j 6= i.
By (ii) in Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, ∂Qi/∂Yj < 0 if ∂ci/∂Yj > 0. If
∂ci/∂Yj < 0, part (iii) of Assumption 1 again guarantees the result.20
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Differentiating firm 1’s profit function yields
∂Π1
∂Y1
=
∂Q1
∂Y1
M1 +
∂M1
∂Y1
Q1.
Using Lemma 1, all terms on the r.h.s. of this equation are positive, and
both M1 (1, 0;Y) > M1 (0, 1;Y) and Q1 (1, 0;Y) > Q1 (0, 1;Y). (4) thus
follows immediately from
∂Q1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) ≥ ∂Q1
∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) and
∂M1
∂Y1
(1, 0; (Y)) ≥ ∂M1
∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) .
(ii) Using
∂2Q1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0, ∂
2M1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0,
arguments similar to those used in the proof of (i) show that ∂2Π1/∂Y1∂Y2 ≤
0 and ∂2Π1/∂Y 21 ≥ 0. (6) thus follows immediately.
(iii) The proof is analogous to the proof of (ii).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) By (4) and exchangeability (Assumption 3), we have
∂Π2
∂Y2
(0, 1;Y ) =
∂Π1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) >
∂Π1
∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) =
∂Π2
∂Y2
(1, 0;Y) . (10)
20In this case, however, |∂cj/∂Yj | > |∂ci/∂Yj | is not sufficent to guarantee the result; it
is necessary that the the left-hand side is sufficiently large.
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Now, define θ = (V1, V2) and x1 = y1, x2 = −y2. By Assumption, Y 01 = Y 02 =
0. Thus, consider the game with objective function
fi (x1, x2; θ) = Πi (θ;x1,−x2)−Ki (|xi| , 0) .
By (6), this game is supermodular.21 By (4), changing θ from (0, 1) to (1, 0)
increases ∂Π1/∂Y1 and reduces ∂Π2/∂Y2. In other words, Πi has increasing
differences in (θ, x). Thus, the result follows from Theorem 5 in Milgrom
and Roberts (1990).
(ii) Suppose H,L ∈ [0,∞),H > L. Define θ1 = (1, 0,H, L), θ2 = (0, 1, L,H) and
an order on {θ1, θ2} by θ1 > θ2. Furthermore, define x1 = y1, x2 = −y2 and
fi (x1, x2; θ) = Πi (θ;x1,−x2)−Ki (|xi| , 0) .
Then f is supermodular in x1, x2. It satisfies increasing differences in (x, θ)
if
∂Π1
∂y1
(1, 0;H + y1, L+ y2)−
∂K1
∂y1
(y1,H) >
∂Π1
∂y1
(0, 1, L+ y1,H + y2)−
∂K1
∂y1
(y1, L) .
Using (4) and the condition ∂2Πi/∂Yi∂yi ≥ ∂2Ki/∂Yi∂yi, it suffices to show
∂Π1
∂y1
(1, 0;L+ y1, L+ y2)−
∂K1
∂y1
(y1, L) >
∂Π1
∂y1
(0, 1, L+ y1, L+ y2)−
∂k1
∂y1
(y1, L) .
This inequality was shown to hold in the proof of (i).
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We need to show (ii). First note that by definition of y1 (0, v2) as firm 1’s strategy
in the equilibrium of the subgame (0, v2),
Π∗1 (1, v2) = Π1 (1, v2; y1 (1, v2) , y2 (1, v2))−K1 (y1 (1, v2) , 0) ≥
Π1 (1, v2; y1 (0, v2) , y2 (1, v2))−K1 (y1 (0, v2) , 0) .
Next, using Proposition 2, y2 (0, v2) ≥ y2 (1, v2). Thus, by Assumption 2,
Π1 (1, v2; y1 (0, v2) , y2 (1, v2)) ≥ Π1 (1, v2; y1 (0, v2) , y2 (0, v2)) .
21See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for the concept of supermodular games.
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Therefore,
Π∗1 (1, v2) ≥ Π1 (1, v2; y1 (0, v2) , y2 (0, v2))−K1 (y1 (0, v2) , 0) .
Subtracting Π∗1 (0, v2) on both sides gives ∆∗1 (v2) ≥ ∆1 (v2;y (0, v2)). The proof
of the second statement is analogous.
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